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Abstract: We critically evaluate the empirical basis for the so-called resource curse and find that, 
despite the topic’s popularity in economics and political science research, this apparent paradox is 
a red herring. The most commonly used measure of ‘resource abundance’ can be more usefully 
interpreted as a proxy for ‘resource dependence’—endogenous to underlying institutional factors. 
In multiple estimations that combine resource abundance and dependence, institutional and 
constitutional variables, we find that (i) resource abundance, constitutions and institutions 
determine resource dependence, (ii) resource dependence does not affect growth, and (iii) resource 
abundance positively affects growth and institutional quality.  
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support. 1. Introduction 
Inspired by work of Sachs and Warner (1995), a new literature is developing that focuses on the 
so-called “resource curse”—the puzzling paradox suggesting that resource-rich countries tend to 
grow more slowly than resource-poor ones. Like most people, economists are fond of paradoxes. It 
is therefore not surprising that the curse has inspired many economists to consider its origins or 
test its robustness. Among the popular early explanations for the curse are ‘structuralist’ theories 
with roots in the 1950s (e.g. Prebisch 1950), rent-seeking analyses (e.g., Tornell and Lane 1999, 
Baland and Francois 2000, Torvik 2002), and stories based on Dutch-disease type of arguments, 
where the non-resource sector is the long-run engine of growth due to increasing returns at the 
sector level but becomes “crowded out” by the resource sector (Matsuyama 1992, Sachs and 
Warner 1999).
1   
The rough contours of a consensus view now seem to be gaining shape.  In the words of a 
recent World Bank publication (Harford and Klein 2005): 
“[Natural resource exports] can damage institutions (including governance and the 
legal system) indirectly––by removing incentives to reform, improve infrastructure, 
or even establish a well-functioning tax bureaucracy––as well as directly––by 
provoking a fight to control resource rents. … There is growing evidence that [this] 
effect is the most problematic.” 
Empirical support for this view is provided by various authors, including Ross (1999, 2001a), 
Leite and Weidmann (2002), Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2004), Isham et al. (2005), Bulte et 
al. (2005) and Hodler (2006).
2 While resource abundance can be a blessing for countries with 
good institutions and a curse for countries with bad institutions (as demonstrated by Mehlum et al. 
2006), the new consensus view goes one step further. It argues that the institutional context itself is 
endogenous and not invariant with respect to resource endowments (see also Sokoloff and 
                                                 
1 See also Wright and Czelusta (2002) for a critical assessment of the claim that the resource sector is 
unlikely to yield spillover benefits, and Matsen and Torvik (2005) for a normative analysis of resource 
management and the Dutch disease. 
2 This is not to argue that there are no “dissident” views: Manzano and Rigobon (2001) focus their analysis 
on debt overhang, Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2004) focus on the role of investments, Gylfason (2001) and 
Bravo-Ortega and De Gregorio (2005) on the role of human capital, and Hausmann and Rigobon (2002) on 
having a diversified export structure. 
  2Engerman 2000, Ross 2001b, Jensen and Wantchekon 2004, Robinson et al. 2006).
3 While the 
exact definition of “institutional quality” is open to debate, most economists agree that it refers to 
the rules of the game, and that it is an important driver of economic development and growth (e.g. 
Easterly and Levine 2003, Rodrik et al. 2004).   
In this paper we challenge the consensus view, and dispute that abundant resources lead to 
bad institutions or slow growth. Instead, the chain of causality appears opposite to current wisdom: 
bad institutions are associated with high scores on the resource abundance indicator popularized 
by Sachs and Warner. To appreciate our argument, it is important to understand that the common 
proxy for resource abundance in the literature on the curse is rather peculiar. It is defined as the 
ratio of resource exports to GDP, generally based on the information for a single year at the 
beginning of the observation period.
4 This ratio is more appropriately thought of as a measure of 
dependence (or intensity) than as a measure of abundance. The denominator explicitly measures 
the magnitude of other activities in the economy. Consequently, the scaling exercise—dividing by 
the size of the economy—implies that the ratio variable is not independent of economic policies 
and the institutions that produce them. Moreover, not only the scale of economic activity, but also 
the comparative advantage in non-resource sectors is to a large extent determined by government 
choices (Clarida and Findlay 1992). Hence, the resource dependence ratio potentially suffers from 
endogeneity problems, and perhaps should not be treated as an exogenous explanatory variable at 
all in growth regressions. Rather, it is the outcome of specific institutional settings.  
Following Williamson (2000), we distinguish between two different perspectives on 
institutions. Some analysts interpret institutions as “deep and durable” characteristics of societies 
(e.g., Glaeser et al. 2004), whereas others view them as the reflection of policy outcomes that are 
in a state of flux (e.g., Knack and Keefer 1995, Rodrik et al. 2004). The former interpretation is 
                                                 
3 In a model by Hodler (2006), the link from resources to institutional deterioration is via conflict.  For other 
work on the link between resources and conflict, refer to Collier and Hoeffler (1998) and others. 
4 Several authors have used alternative measures of resource abundance, casting some doubts on the 
consistency and robustness of the curse.  Results of Gylfason (2001), Atkinson and Hamilton (2003), and 
Boyce and Emery (2006) suggest that the overall growth curse remains, although Boschini et al. (2004) 
confine it to countries with bad institutions. Brunnschweiler (2006) finds no curse evidence using World 
Bank resource data, while Stijns (2002) considers physical reserves and finds that the curse disappears for 
resources other than land; a result which in turn is challenged by Norman (2005).   
  3consistent with the idea of institutions as persistent constitutional variables—think of presidential 
systems versus parliamentary ones, or the specification of electoral rules. Within the framework of 
constitutional design, policy makers formulate specific short-term “governance” policies to fight 
corruption, uphold the rule of law, invest in human capital for public servants, etc. Constitutional 
design therefore determines a range of policy outcomes—institutional proxies and otherwise 
(Persson and Tabellini, 2003, 2004, Persson 2005). Evidently, the interpretation of institutions as 
policy outcomes is more likely to suffer from endogeneity problems in the context of growth 
regressions. 
Both the “durable constraints” and the “changeable policy outcome” interpretations of 
institutions are potentially relevant for the resource curse. Persson and Tabellini (hereafter PT, 
2003, 2004) have pioneered the notion that constitutional designs have observable consequences 
on economic policies. Key concepts in their analysis are accountability and representativeness of a 
country’s executive body. They find that both presidential regimes and majoritarian electoral rules 
(as opposed to parliamentarian systems and proportional representation) tend to be associated with 
more spending for special interests, at the expense of public goods that benefit a wider swathe of 
voters (and that could enhance economic growth).  The reason is that presidential regimes and 
majoritarian rules imply that the incumbent decision maker is not dependent on a stable majority 
among the legislators, and is therefore more likely to cater to the interests of powerful minorities 
(for more information, refer to Persson et al. 2000, PT 2003). In the context of the resource curse, 
one may therefore expect that sectoral lobbying for preferential treatment is more successful in 
presidential than in parliamentary systems. Basing their analysis on the Sachs-Warner ratio of 
resource exports as a share of GDP, Andersen and Aslaksen (2006) indeed provide evidence that 
the “curse” is more likely to materialize in presidential regimes (and in non-democracies). 
  The objectives of this paper are threefold. First, we explore the underlying factors that 
determine resource dependence and institutional quality, and properly account for them in 2SLS 
and 3SLS regression analyses of economic growth.  Second, we explore the impact of an 
alternative and exogenous measure of resource abundance (based on the value of resource 
stocks—see section 2) on economic growth and institutional quality. And third, we aim to dig 
  4deeper into the institutional dimensions of policy making by distinguishing between “durable” and 
“changeable” interpretations of institutions—i.e., how constitutional variables and institutional 
outcomes interact to give rise to virtuous or vicious circles of development. 
Our main results turn received wisdom upside down. First, resource dependence, based on 
the conventional Sachs-Warner ‘resource’ measure in regression analyses, is influenced both by 
durable and changeable institutions, even if we control for physical resource abundance. Treating 
resource dependence as endogenous, we reverse the causality implied in earlier work. That is: 
contrary to the paradoxical result that resource “abundant” countries tend to invite rent seeking and 
therefore suffer from worse institutions, we find that countries with certain institutional designs 
fail to industrialize—and failing to develop significant non-resource sectors makes them 
dependent on primary sector extraction. Second, within the set of constitutional variables, we find 
that the form of government (presidential versus parliamentary system) is more relevant than the 
form of the electoral system.  We interpret this as evidence that sectoral lobbying pressure from 
resource firms is more relevant for policy design than electoral pressure through geographically 
defined constituencies. We present corroborative evidence for this interpretation by distinguishing 
between different types of resources—clustered ones versus diffuse ones. Third, and perhaps most 
importantly, we find that the resource curse is a red herring.  Properly accounting for resource 
wealth implies that resources are a blessing for both institutional and economic development—not 
a curse. Moreover, instrumenting for resource dependence implies that this variable is no longer 
significant in growth regressions.  Finally, all these results are robust when we restrict the sample 
to democracies only. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we introduce and explain the data, and 
outline our regression strategy. In section 3 we present OLS regressions of resource dependence 
and institutional quality, and 2SLS and 3SLS regressions of economic growth and income levels. 
Section 4 concludes. 
 
 
  52. Estimation strategy and data   
In this section, we outline our empirical procedure and present the most important data. Our aim is 
to explore the underlying factors that determine the degree to which economies depend on exports 
of natural resources, and analyze the impacts of resource abundance and dependence on economic 
performance and institutional quality. Resource abundance may directly affect economic growth, 
but the influence may also be indirect. Our empirical approach allows us to examine both direct 
and indirect links.   
We run three different regression equations. Following earlier work (Leite and Weidmann 
2002, Isham et al. 2004, Bulte et al. 2005), we first perform a series of estimations to analyze 
whether resource abundance (RA) does in fact have the commonly reported negative effect on 
institutional quality (I). Specifically, we try to unravel the determinants of institutional quality as 
follows:  
(1)  I = b0 + b1*conditioning variables + b2*RA + e. 
Our main conditioning variables include latitude measured in absolute terms—a common 
instrument for institutions
5—and regional dummy variables, as well as resource dependence (RD) 
in some specifications to check for a curse on institutions in a more conventional form. In light of 
earlier evidence, we distinguish between different “types” of resources: point resources, which are 
geographically clustered in space and relatively easy to monitor and control, versus diffuse 
resources spread across space. If resources are a curse for institutional quality, as has been argued 
in the past based on studies regressing I on RD as opposed to RA, then b2<0. But if resource 
abundance is positively associated with institutions—due to an income effect, say—then b2 > 0. 
The term “resource curse” would be inappropriate then.   
In a second step, we study the association between RD on the one hand, and RA as well as 
“durable” and “changeable” institutional factors on the other. As outlined above, we distinguish 
between the “durable” constitutional dummy-variables for regime type and electoral rules (CV), 
                                                 
5 All relevant estimations were also run with other frequent instruments for institutions, including the log of 
settler mortality and the fractions of the population speaking English or another Western European language. 
Latitude proved the strongest instrument for a large sample of countries, followed by the log of settler 
mortality (for the much smaller sample of ex-colonies only). We focus on the results using latitude; results 
using the other instruments are very similar and can be requested from the authors. 
  6and the “changeable” indicators for institutions or institutional quality (I). In other words, we 
explore whether RD is an exogenous variable, as implicitly assumed in earlier work, or not. Our 
reduced-form ‘dependence equation’ is specified as follows: 
(2)  RD = a0 + a1*conditioning variables + a2*RA + a3*CV + a4*I + e,  
where our main conditioning variables are historic openness averaged over 1950-1969, and 
regional dummies. There are several reasons why we believe RD may be best treated as an 
endogenous variable. Obviously, it is likely to be positively influenced by resource abundance due 
to comparative advantage arguments (which is also why most conventional regression analyses 
treat the former as a proxy for the latter). But institutions may also matter, because they influence 
policy-making and (indirectly) affect incentives to invest and develop industrial or formal services 
sectors and thereby reduce the dependence on resources. Therefore, we expect a2>0 and a3, a4<0.
6  
In an additional step, we integrate the findings from equation (1) by endogenizing the changeable 
indicators for institutional quality I in a 2SLS procedure. 
Finally, we test for the presence of a direct effect of RA on economic growth (G), i.e., 
effects not transmitted through either I or RD: 
(3)  G  = c0 + c1*RD + c2*I + c3*RA + c4* conditioning variables + e, 
where RD and I are estimated using (1) and (2). Equation (3) reflects that resource abundance may 
potentially have an impact on economic performance measures through three channels: indirectly 
via resource dependence or institutional quality, and directly as an asset that may be traded. It will 
be interesting to see if resource dependence, i.e. the conventional resource variable in resource 
curse papers, is still significant if we treat it as endogenous.     
Next, we introduce the various data and their sources that we will use to estimate 
equations (1) – (3). Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the main dependent variables and 
instruments for resource dependence. The first column covers our base sample of some 60 
countries from five regions (Europe, North America, Central and South America, Africa and the 
Middle East, Asia and Oceania) for which we have data on mineral resource abundance and export 
                                                 
6 The two dummy variables for constitutional design, CV, assign values of one to countries which have a 
presidential regime vs. a parliamentary one, and to those which have majoritarian vs. proportional electoral 
rules. 
  7shares.
7 Given the particular importance of point-source resources for institutional and economic 
development found in the literature, this will constitute our preferred sample. The second column 
depicts the descriptive statistics for the larger sample, covering total resource abundance and 
export shares in over 80 countries. In general, our variables show little variation between the two 
samples. 
The first row depicts the log of average growth of per capita GDP (PPP adjusted) between 
1970-2000 (g7000). Korea was the growth leader during this period in both samples, while Zambia 
was at the very bottom of the growth ladder.  
Our main resource dependence variables, the GDP shares of total natural resource and 
mineral resource exports—based on the Sachs and Warner “resource abundance” variable—are 
described in rows 3-4. They are compiled on the basis of information from the World 
Development Indicators and aggregate the export share of total natural resources (natxp), i.e. the 
sum of mineral and agricultural raw material exports over GDP, and the export shares of mineral 
ores, metals and fuels (minxp), respectively.
8 We average the shares over the period 1970-1989 
because on the one hand, choosing a single year could lead to spurious links and false conclusions 
since exports are inevitably influenced by market conditions (see e.g. Ledermann and Maloney 
2003). In addition, the 1970s saw unusually large turbulence in many resource prices due to 
external shocks, which suggests using a longer time span.
9 Total natural resource dependence in 
our base sample and larger sample varies from GDP shares of practically zero for Japan and 
Mauritius to over 0.4 in the cases of Trinidad and Tobago and Zambia. Similarly, Nepal and 
Burkina Faso have exported next to no mineral resources relative to their GDP, while Trinidad and 
Tobago and Zambia again top the list with a GDP share of over 0.4. In Figure 1 we plot economic 
growth against resource dependence for a simple regression fit—controlling only for initial income 
                                                 
7 Former Soviet and most Middle Eastern countries are excluded due to data unavailability. The mineral 
resource abundance and the electoral rule dummy proved the main constraining variables for the sample 
size. 
8 We also collected data on the disaggregated period average GDP shares of agricultural raw materials 
exports (agrixp). Details on these and all other variables employed can be found in Appendix B. 
9 We performed all estimations with alternative period averages for resource dependence (1970s and 1970-
2000) with qualitatively unchanged results. 
  8and the change in terms of trade—confirming that the “curse” also materializes for our dataset 
(detailed results given in Table 5, column (1)).
10
The next two rows show our preferred natural resource abundance measures, the logs of 
total natural capital and mineral resource assets in USD per capita. The data is taken from a World 
Bank (1997) study on countries' natural resource wealth and is estimated for the year 1994. The 
measure for total natural capital aggregates the estimates for subsoil assets, cropland, pastureland, 
timber and non-timber forest resources, and protected areas; the subsoil wealth measure values the 
principal fuel and non-fuel mineral stocks present in a country. All estimates are based on 
valuations of the net present value of benefits over a time horizon of 20-25 years (see World Bank 
1997 for further details). The richest countries in terms of overall resources turn out to be 
Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Norway, while Venezuela and Norway have the most subsoil 
assets relative to their population. Jordan and Malawi have the least total natural resources; and 
Belgium, Benin, Ghana, and Nepal share the bottom of the scale as regards subsoil wealth. 
Similarly to Gylfason (2001), when we use data for the 1990s we implicitly assume that 
cumulative resource extraction since the 1970s has not significantly altered countries’ relative 
resource abundance two decades later. This is supported by a high positive correlation with 
resource production data for the early 1970s: the countries which produced the most at the 
beginning of our observation period still had the richest resource stocks in the 1990s   
(Brunnschweiler 2006, see also Stijns 2002).
11
A second issue concerns the exogeneity of our resource wealth measures. We challenge 
prior work by arguing that the commonly used resource variable of Sachs and Warner is 
endogenous; but to what extent do our variables offer an improvement?  The accuracy and 
reliability of the country data were important concerns for the authors of the World Bank (1997) 
study; nevertheless, one could object that basic data availability is already subject to a country's 
                                                 
10 The curse result is even stronger when we omit the outliers on the far right (t-ratio becomes -2.79, 
significant at the one-percent level).   
11 In Appendix A, Table A we show how various “abundance” measures discussed in this paper are 
correlated. For example, the correlation between our abundance variables and the 1970 primary exports to 
GNP ratio from Sachs and Warner (1997) is 0.18 for subsoil assets and practically zero for total natural 
resource wealth.  
  9technological level.
12  We argue however that the data on natural resource wealth are likely to be 
independent of local issues, and therefore truly exogenous for our purpose. In particular, we 
contend that the (fuel and non-fuel) mineral deposits which determine our core sample have been 
well explored and estimated due to their substantial economic potential, and thanks also to the 
involvement of large multinational firms who use similar technical approaches to gather their 
information, and do so regardless of the local political or technological conditions.
13 We are not 
suggesting that our resource abundance data are beyond criticism: rather, they are less prone to the 
policy endogeneity which plagues export-based measures; less subject to technology standards 
which influence production levels; and only reasonably affected by price fluctuations (and market 
conditions), which must be an issue for any measure that attempts to assign a “true” (i.e. 
monetary) value to natural resource wealth. 
As described above, we use two variables for the constitutional design, i.e. the 
fundamental and durable institutional characteristics, at the beginning of the period, depicted in 
rows 7-8. They are based on the classification of the Database of Political Institutions (DPI) 
compiled by Beck et al. (2005), and supplemented with data from PT (2004). As not all countries 
are coded starting in 1970, we use the first available entry for the 1970s.
14 The DPI codes a 
country's form of government as "presidential" (pres70s=1) when the chief executive is largely 
independent of the legislature. This is true both when the president is directly elected by popular 
vote (as in the "classical" presidential model); or when the chief executive is elected by the 
assembly, but cannot easily be recalled once in office and therefore is mostly independent vis-à-vis 
                                                 
12 In fact, the correlation between average years of schooling of the population—a common proxy for the 
level of technology—in 1970 and our main measure of resource abundance, subsoil wealth, is a very modest 
0.28, and 0.56 for total natural resource wealth. 
13 Around 90% of known oil and gas stocks are controlled by national companies, but “…because of the 
enormous capital and technological resources necessary to exploit minerals, foreign oil companies became 
the dominant internal actors in all oil exporters […] The complexities of the international market, the 
continued need for foreign investment and technology, and their links to other powerful actors mean that 
these companies still retain significant power even after nationalization.” (Karl 1997: p.55) Moreover, 
foreign mineral companies have been willing to get involved in production even if local political and 
regulatory conditions were unstable or deteriorated to the point of open conflict. A telling example is Shell’s 
long-standing involvement in oil production in Nigeria despite violent conflict, and its willingness even to 
enter into arrangements with both warring parties to ensure production continuity (see e.g. Zalik 2004).  
14 In a few cases, the form of government changed during the decade; we use the later classification, as it is 
more likely to be important for development until 2000. 
  10the other branches of the political system. The alternative is a strictly parliamentary form of 
government (pres70s=0). This definition corresponds to that of PT (2003, 2004); nevertheless, the 
classifications for the relevant years differ for three countries in our sample, namely Greece, 
Nepal, and Portugal. In these cases, we preferred the DPI coding, as it is more careful in indicating 
the true balance of power in the executive. 
Regarding the electoral rule, a country is considered "majoritarian" (maj70s =1) when all 
or the majority of the house seats are elected by plurality rule, the alternative being (mostly) 
proportional rule (maj70s=0). This DPI definition differs slightly from that of PT (2003, 2004), 
who consider a country's electoral rule to be majoritarian only if all house seats are elected by 
plurality, adding a third, "mixed" possibility to the classification. The country coding accordingly 
diverges for two countries in our sample, Japan and Mexico. Again, we follow the definition of the 
DPI in conflicting cases. Looking at the data, we see that the samples are divided roughly 
according to the global prevalence of presidential over parliamentary political regimes, and the 
closer balance between majoritarian and proportional electoral formulas. We can consequently 
avoid a possible sample bias in our estimations. 
The next two rows in Table 1 describe our main measures of “changeable” institutional 
quality. They were compiled by Kaufmann et al. (2005) for the World Bank and measure the rule 
of law (rule), i.e. the quality of contract enforcement, police, and courts, as well as the likelihood 
of crime and violence; and what we dub government effectiveness (goveffect), i.e. the quality of 
the bureaucracy and public services. Both are recalibrated to assume values between 0 (weakest 
institutions) and 5 (strongest). The World Bank data have the advantages of a very wide country 
coverage and relative objectiveness thanks to a large survey base, which makes them particularly 
attractive for econometric analysis.
15 The differences between the samples are only slight, while 
                                                 
15 We performed robustness checks using several alternative institutional quality measures, including the 
remaining Kaufmann et al (2005) variables (e.g. corruption control, voice and accountability). As these data 
begin in 1996, we also compared results using measures for earlier time periods, namely the measure of the 
quality of the legal system and property rights enforcement for the 1970s from the Fraser Institute’s 
Freedom of the World database, and the measure of rule of law for 1982 compiled by Political Risk 
Services, taken from Sachs and Warner (1997). Correlations between the four measures were very high (0.8 
and more), suggesting that institutions in our country sample have undergone only limited qualitative change 
  11the variation within the samples (the standard deviation is just above unity) shows that there are 
considerable differences in institutional quality among the countries in our survey. The Republic 
of Congo has the weakest and Norway the strongest institutions in our base sample, while Haiti 
exhibits the weakest institutions and Switzerland the strongest in the larger sample.  
Finally, the last row describes our historic openness indicator for the two decades 
preceding our observation period, which serves as another principal instrument for explaining 
resource dependence in our estimations. It is calculated as the average ratio of imports plus exports 
to GDP between 1950-1969 to avoid endogeneity problems.
16 The data shows that there is wide 
variation in openness to trade in our samples, with a standard deviation of around 0.24. 
 
3. Empirical results 
We first analyze the determinants of institutions according to equation (1). In the most 
parsimonious specification, we use latitude as the main instrument for institutional quality and add 
natural resource abundance to explore whether resource wealth erodes institutional quality, be it 
through rent-seeking, conflict, or otherwise. The results, controlling for region-specific effects 
(Europe is the omitted region), are reported in Table 2, columns (1)-(4). They show that, quite 
contrary to earlier work on the resource curse – which argues that resources undermine economic 
performance through weakening of institutional structures – there is a positive correlation between 
resource abundance and institutional quality.  Possibly this reflects the income effects of resource 
booms and discoveries, enabling countries to introduce superior institutions, while at the same 
time increasing the demand for such improvements.
17  
                                                                                                                                                   
over the last three decades. The estimation results with alternative institutional measures further confirm our 
main observations on the effects of natural resource abundance and dependence.  
16 Nevertheless, the possible endogeneity of the openness measure was considered in separate estimations by 
using the predicted trade shares developed by Frankel and Romer (1999) as an instrument. Results were not 
affected (available upon request). 
17  There are several plausible mechanisms linking higher incomes to better economic and political 
institutions. Glaeser et al (2004) argue that institutional quality as conventionally measured in economic 
studies is not really a "deep" variable but a policy choice (affected by human capital and income). Moreover, 
income shocks affecting real wages of civil servants may affect the willingness to accept bribes (e.g., Chand 
and Moene 1999, Mookherjee 1997) or have an impact on morale—both corruption and quality of the 
bureaucracy are conventional measures of institutional quality. Miguel et al. (2004) document that adverse 
  12To check if resource dependence has an impact on institutional quality, as postulated by 
advocates of the resource curse consensus, we also add the aggregate resource and mineral 
resource dependence variables to the analysis in columns (5)-(8). Although it mostly enters with a 
negative sign, resource dependence proves insignificant once we control for actual resource 
abundance. We interpret this as evidence that the consensus view on the chain of causality linking 
resources to institutions should be reversed.  
We now consider whether the ratio of resource exports to GDP is a proper explanatory 
variable in growth regressions.  Since the denominator of this dependence measure is the size of 
the economy, it seems reasonable to expect that the variable is endogenous with respect to various 
variables that determine economic performance. We “explain” resource dependence with our 
indicators for institutions and add the two constitutional variables. Insofar as institutional quality 
and certain constitutional designs are associated with high incomes and growth-enhancing 
economic policies, we expect them to be negatively correlated with resource dependence.   
In Table 3 we present the results of equation (2) and explore whether our prior expectation 
is correct, controlling for resource abundance and several other variables. In the various columns 
we distinguish between different types of resource dependence.  Earlier work by Leite and 
Weidmann (2002), Isham et al (2005), and Bulte et al (2005) suggests that “point resources” have 
a different impact on the economy than “diffuse resources”. Columns (1) and (2) interpret resource 
dependence quite broadly so that it encompasses all types of primary exports; columns (3) and (4) 
focus on agricultural exports; and columns (5) - (8) present results for the narrower category of 
mineral resources. Consistent with earlier results, we find significant differences between mineral 
and agricultural exports, which in turn determine the findings for aggregate resource exports. The 
results are especially strong for the dependence on mineral resources, as is evident from the values 
for R-square and the highly significant F-statistics; they clearly indicate that resource dependence 
is greatly influenced by many “deep” variables of economies. This suggests that using resource 
                                                                                                                                                   
income shocks increase the risk of civil conflict, which in turn affects institutional quality. The model by 
Findlay and Lundahl (2001) is not explicitly about institutional development, but could be interpreted that 
way. For information on the relation between income and political institutions, refer to Barro (1996, 1999), 
Durham (1999) and Acemoglu et al. (2005). 
  13dependence as an exogenous variable could produce misleading or biased outcomes, and makes an 
IV approach more suitable.
18
First consider mineral resource dependence, as presented in columns (5) – (8), for which 
we find significant and robust results. Consistent with our expectations, we find that the 
presidential regime dummy is positively correlated with mineral resource dependence, and remains 
significant at least at the 5%-level even when we control for regions and institutional quality. The 
results suggest that having a presidential instead of a parliamentary system would have increased 
mineral resource dependence during this period by up to six percentage points (all other things 
equal). On the other hand, there is practically never any significant correlation between electoral 
rules and dependence, and in column (6) we see that omitting the majoritarian dummy does not 
affect results for our other explanatory variables.
19 Since both majority rule and presidential 
systems are associated with a tendency to cater to interest groups and minorities (PT 2004), our 
findings suggest that sectoral lobbies (from resource industries) tend to be more successful in 
pursuing distorting policies than geographic lobbies (working through constituencies). This is not 
unexpected. Also, it is unsurprising that openness and resource abundance are positively correlated 
with resource dependence. Openness affects both the numerator and denominator of the resource 
dependence variable; but the former effect dominates, as later results from 2SLS will show where 
openness turns out to have no direct effect on economic development. The abundance result 
reflects that some countries have a comparative advantage in primary industries, which is a 
relevant consideration regardless of institutions and constitutions—think of Norway, Canada and 
Australia. 
                                                 
18 Ding and Field (2005) also consider the endogeneity of resource dependence. However, their dependence 
measure is based on the share of natural capital in total capital, which less closely resembles the commonly 
used exports measures, and furthermore focus on the role of human capital for resource dependence and 
economic growth. 
19 All regressions were performed both with and without the weak majoritarian instrument, with the main 
change lying in the magnitude of the F-statistics. We also used a finer breakdown of the constitutional 
variables, which confirms that the governmental system—and especially a presidential one—is more 
important in determining the level of resource dependence than the electoral rules. However, having both a 
presidential system and majoritarian electoral rules appears to increase resource dependence by 7.4 
percentage points relative to where a parliamentary system is combined with proportional electoral rules. 
The combination of a presidential system with proportional electoral rules, on the other hand, lead to an 
average 5.4 percentage point increase in resource dependence, while parliamentary systems with 
majoritarian rules showed a significant difference only in democracies.  See Appendix A, Table C for 
detailed results. 
  14In columns (7) and (8) we introduce two important institutional variables—rule of law and 
government effectiveness. These will constitute our basic specifications for later estimations. Not 
only are the earlier results robust; equally interesting, we find that the institutions variables enter 
with a significant negative sign (at the 2%-level). This suggests that better-quality institutions lead 
to less resource dependence (as opposed to the other way around). This statement is supported 
even when we instrument for institutional quality, to account for the probable endogeneity of this 
variable; in the results reported in columns (9) - (12), we find that the negative relation persists. 
This is a finding of interest, and one that we can possibly explain by the impact of the quality of 
institutions—proxied by “rule of law” and “government effectiveness”—on incentives to invest in 
other sectors of the economy—affecting GDP, the denominator of the dependence variable.
20   
  Columns (3) and (4) indicate that dependence on agriculture is not adequately explained 
by the same variables. The goodness of fit of these regressions is much worse, and our presidential 
dummy is no longer significant. We believe this is due to the “diffuse nature” of agriculture, 
making it harder for farmers in developing countries to organize themselves into lobby groups and 
successfully appeal for special favors. The institutional quality variables also (narrowly) miss 
conventional levels of significance (as shown in column (3)), although the sign is consistently 
negative. Not surprisingly, we find that natural capital—which also captures soil quality—is 
significantly associated with exports of agricultural products. However, in separate estimations we 
find that sheer country size is in fact more important than the value of the land in explaining the 
dependence on agricultural exports.   
When the separate effects of point-source mineral resource and diffuse agricultural 
resource dependence are aggregated, we are able to account for a large part of total natural 
resource dependence using some common explanatory variables (columns (1)-(2)). But we note 
from the results in column (2) that the strength of our explanation for total resource dependence is 
due in large part to the importance of minerals in overall exports: the values for R-square and the 
                                                 
20 All our main results are robust with respect to including alternative regressors: ethnic fractionalization, 
foreign direct investment, the average GDP shares of investment and government consumption, initial 
income, average schooling levels, distance to navigable port, and country size. Introducing colonial origins 
is slightly more complicated because of the multicollinearity that emerges when controlling for both colonial 
history and constitutional design. 
  15F-statistic jump upward when we use subsoil wealth as the resource abundance proxy. However, 
the differing factors which explain the extent of mineral and non-mineral resource dependence 
weaken each other’s effect on total resource dependence, and the results are no longer robust to 
regional controls, nor is institutional quality robustly linked to resource dependence (not shown).  
Taken together, Tables 2 and 3 enable us to discuss the net effect of resource abundance 
on resource dependence. On the one hand there is a direct effect based on the comparative 
advantage argument (captured in Table 3). On the other, resource abundance also enhances 
institutional quality (Table 2), which in turn translates into reduced dependence on primary exports 
(of the mineral kind, see Table 3). However, our estimations show that the comparative-advantage 
effect dominates the indirect institutions effect. For example, a one-standard-deviation increase in 
a country’s per-capita subsoil wealth would lead to an expected average increase in (mineral) 
resource dependence of 0.032, i.e. over three percentage points or one-third of a standard 
deviation.
21 The less-than-proportional impact of resource abundance on the degree of resource 
dependence would further confirm our hypothesis that the traditional resource dependence variable 
is only a weak proxy for true resource abundance.  
Of course, the assumption is that all other factors are held constant, which complicates 
real-life thought experiments. One possible objection could be that the results so far are mainly 
due to the circumstances in non-democratic and authoritarian developing countries (which are also 
considered presidential in the dummy classification). Such countries may also have weaker 
economic performance and worse policies per se, and therefore bias the results in favor of our 
hypotheses.
22  We examine this possibility by restricting our sample to democratic countries only, 
i.e. countries which scored “5” or lower on the 1972 Gastil index compiled by Freedom House.
23  
                                                 
21 For this example, we use the results from Table 3, column (7), and Table 2, column (2): 1.857*(0.109* 
(-0.035)+0.021)=0.032. The corresponding beta coefficient is 0.032/0.093=0.344, which gives the effect of 
mineral abundance on dependence in terms of standard deviations. Estimates from 2SLS with endogenous 
institutions deliver practically identical results.  
22 For a discussion of these issues, refer to Przeworski and Limongi (1993), Barro (1996, 1999), and 
Acemoglu et al. (2005). 
23 1972 represents the first year for which Freedom House compiled its index. A more stringent 
classification of democracies calls for a Gastil score of “3.5” or less. Basic results do not change, but the 
sample becomes too limited for useful statistical inference. Another alternative is to restrict the sample to 
countries with a positive or—more stringent—to a polity index score above 8 (from the Polity IV project); 
estimation results for these samples also do not falsify our conclusions and are available upon request.  
  16The results reported in Table 4 show that our earlier conclusions are largely unaffected. 
Specifically, democratic countries with presidential regimes or low institutional quality are more 
resource dependent, although the influence of one type of political regime over the other is less 
clearcut. We also find that resource abundance still has a positive impact on resource dependence 
and institutional quality. However, the indirect effect of resource abundance on dependence via 
institutions (columns (3)-(4)) is strengthened relative to the direct, comparative-advantage effect. 
Although comparative advantage prevails and the net effect remains positive, the impact is 
weaker.
24 One interpretation is that in countries with better-developed institutions—which is 
typically the case in democracies—the structure of the economy will be less biased towards lower-
growth sectors such as natural resource extraction and export even if there does happen to be a 
relative resource abundance.  
  We now turn to our main results. In the first column of Table 5, we show OLS results for a 
growth regression of the type popular in the resource curse literature (corresponding to the 
regression fit in Figure 1), in order to test whether our findings depend merely on our narrower 
sample. We still find a significant curse result for our dependence measure, even when using a less 
parsimonious specification (not shown). We can therefore concentrate on the outcomes of the 
2SLS regressions reported in the following columns, where we regress per capita income growth 
between 1970-2000 on the endogenous variables resource dependence and institutional quality. 
Only second-stage coefficients are shown. 
In columns (2)–(5) we provide the basic estimation results when instrumenting for 
resource dependence to correct for omitted variables, measurement errors and reverse causality.  
Columns (2) and (3) consider the full set of countries, and in columns (4) and (5) we restrict the 
analysis to democracies only. The first noteworthy result is that there is no significant association 
between resource dependence and income growth––although the sign is negative, the conventional 
“curse” ceases to exist. But our analysis redeems resources to an even greater extent: the resource 
                                                 
24 As before, the result is reached by adding the effects, this time using the standard deviations for the 
reduced, democratic sample: 1.807*(0.165*(-0.029)+0.015)=0.018, which corresponds to a beta coefficient 
of 0.018/0.11=0.168. In additional estimations shown in Appendix A, Table B, we also found that countries 
with a presidential regime tended to have worse-quality institutions, an effect which persisted in the 
democracies-only sample. 
  17abundance variable enters positively and significantly in the second stage estimations, and the 
cumulative net effect on average growth turns out to be positive.
25 Moreover, the political and 
economic mechanisms linking resources to economic performance are not driven by idiosyncracies 
of dictatorships. We believe these results lend credibility to earlier ideas advanced by Davis (1995, 
1998)—ideas that got snowed under in recent years by the emphasis on the detrimental effects of 
resources on growth and peace. Interestingly, the Hansen J statistics imply that constitutional 
design and openness to trade have no significant direct effect on economic development, but only 
influence it via their impact on the degree of resource dependence. 
  After having established that institutional quality is not invariant with respect to some of 
the deep economic and political variables, we also instrument for our two institutional proxies: 
Government Effectiveness and Rule of Law. The 2SLS results are provided in columns (6)–(9). 
Consistent with previous results, we find that that the resource dependence variable does not enter 
significantly, and even becomes positive when considering the quality of the bureaucracy (column 
(7)). Institutions enter positively and sometimes significantly in the large sample; but the results of 
the estimations in the democracy sample in particular suffer from multicollinearity problems, 
which weigh heavily in the small sample. Resource abundance still positively affects institutions in 
the first stage of the IV analysis; however, we now find only weak evidence of a direct effect on 
income growth. This suggests that the indirect institutional effect of resource abundance as shown 
in Table 3 is perhaps the main link from resources to economic performance. Nevertheless, the 
consistently positive signs show that natural resources have the potential to be a “double blessing” 
for economic growth rather than a curse.   
We now take the final step and estimate the full system of equations (1)-(3) described in 
Section 2, simultaneously instrumenting for both resource dependence and institutions. Since we 
have two endogenous variables in our system, we expect not only the disturbance in equation (3) 
to be correlated with the endogenous variables, but also the disturbances among the three 
                                                 
25 For example, we can get an idea of the ceteris paribus average resource effect on growth by summing up 
the effects at the two stages (note that the insignificant dependence coefficient makes this only a very rough 
estimate): 0.015*(-2.003)+0.153=0.123, and a beta coefficient of (0.123*1.857)/0.813=0.281. 
  18equations to be correlated. This suggests using a 3SLS approach.
26 In this analysis we aim to trace 
back the chain of causal relationships all the way to exogenous variables (resource abundance, 
constitutional variables, and latitude), but it is evident that this comes at a cost. The first and 
second-stage F-statistic is a useful summary statistic for assessing the potential bias in the second 
stage (the inverse of the F-statistic is proportional to the bias in the second stage). From the earlier 
tables it is evident that in particular instrumenting for resource dependence may introduce some 
bias, and the 3SLS analysis shown in Table 6 compounds that bias by regressing dependence on 
the predicted institutions variable. The main culprit for what must be a cautious statistical 
inference at this stage appears to be our small sample size, which in turn is due to the limited 
number of countries for which we have resource abundance data.   
Notwithstanding these qualifications and caveats, the results in Table 6 support the earlier 
findings. All signs are as expected, and the magnitude and significance of the main coefficients of 
interest are generally consistent with our previous findings. In no regression do we find that 
resource dependence significantly impacts the average growth rate.  Moreover, mineral resource 
abundance seems to have a positive overall effect on economic performance which is significantly 
different from zero (p-values for the Wald test of 0.000 or below in all specifications), confirming 
our view that there is no real evidence of a curse. Again, we limit our sample to democracies only 
in columns (3)-(4) to check if the results are driven by countries with weaker institutional 
frameworks, and find substantially unchanged effects.  
 
4. Conclusions and discussion 
The paradoxical finding of a negative relationship between a sizable resource sector and economic 
growth has attracted widespread attention from academics, policy makers and international 
organizations.
27 The main causal mechanism linking resources to poor performance is commonly 
hypothesized to be “executive discretion over resource rents” (Jensen and Wantchekon 2004). 
                                                 
26 For more information on 3SLS, see e.g. Greene (2003). 
27 In recent years the curse phenomenon has also been introduced to new domains of “windfall gains”.  For 
example, within World Bank circles one now hears people debating whether there might exist a curse of aid 
(Djankov et al. 2005, Harford and Klein 2005). 
  19According to this view, an abundance of rents allows incumbent politicians to maintain support 
and consolidate their power base through repression, buying off the opposition, or institutionalized 
patronage (including massive spending on public service employment). Since such policies are 
unlikely to promote economic growth, it is no surprise that economic and political performance is 
not independent. The logic of the story, combined with the fact that it is corroborated with 
observations of certain countries in the developing world, has undoubtedly added to the appeal of 
the resource curse hypothesis.  
However, our empirical results cast new light on the validity of this emerging consensus. 
There exists a discrepancy between the theory behind the curse, and the empirical work used to 
support it. Specifically, abundant resource rents, usually referred to as a “windfall gain”, are a 
crucial element in the theory; but the bulk of the empirics is based on a measure of resource 
dependence instead (specifically, on resource exports divided by GDP). It is not obvious that 
resource dependence is a proper exogenous variable in regression analysis, and our analysis 
suggests it is not. Treating resource dependence as endogenous, we find that it is no longer 
significant in growth regressions, and has no effect on institutional quality. In contrast, resource 
abundance is significantly associated with both growth and institutional quality, but the nature of 
this association runs contrary to the resource curse hypothesis: greater abundance leads to better 
institutions and more rapid growth.
28
The puzzling result that resource wealth appears to impede growth seems to be a red 
herring, and its origins may be traced back to confusing semantics. In discussing the impact of 
natural resources on growth, it is useful to distinguish between resource abundance (a stock 
measure of in situ resource wealth), resource rents (the ‘windfall’ flow of income derived from the 
resource stock at some point in time), and resource dependence (the degree to which countries 
do—or do not—have access to alternative sources of income other than resource extraction, again 
at some point in time). These concepts are possibly correlated—countries with large resource 
stocks may derive high incomes from extraction, and because of Dutch-disease arguments or 
                                                 
28 In separate estimations, the positive effects of natural resource abundance were also confirmed for current 
income levels. However, the level effects are less clearcut and necessitate further investigation, which goes 
beyond the scope of the present paper.  
  20otherwise, may specialize in primary exports and become dependent on resources. But some 
resource-abundant countries are not dependent on resources, and some relatively resource-scarce 
countries are. We find countries should not turn their back on resource wealth to lower resource 
dependence. 
How may we reconcile our finding that resource-abundant countries tend to be better off 
than resource-poor ones with the existing literature? One possible explanation could be that 
resources in the ground do not pose the same problem for institutional quality or economic 
performance as flows of resource rents do. But this begs another question—since resource stocks 
can be converted into flows of money, why would outcomes for stocks and flows be different? 
Another possible explanation is more straightforward and fully consistent with our main 
findings—the curse simply does not exist. The empirically significant relationship between 
institutional quality and resource dependence reflects that countries with poor institutions are 
unlikely to develop non-primary production sectors to reduce their dependence on resource 
exports. If so, the causality would be from institutions to dependence, and not the other way 
around. It would be inappropriate to talk about the “curse of resources” then. Instead, growth 
regressions in the resource curse literature may be viewed as a reminder of the important direct 
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coef = −2.862097, (robust) se = 1.5125654, t = −1.89
Figure 1. GDP share of mineral exports and income growth
Notes: Detailed regression results are given in Table 5, column (1).
25Table 1. Descriptive statistics of main variables
Basesample Largesample
Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Average income growth 1970-2000 (g7000) 2.457 0.813 2.398 0.802
Average natural resource exports over GDP 1970-1980 (natxp) 0.073 0.095 0.065 0.089
Average mineral resource exports over GDP 1970-1980 (minxp) 0.059 0.093 0.05 0.087
Log of total natural capital in USD per capita (lnatcap) 8.547 0.860 8.517 0.863
Log of subsoil assets in USD per capita (lsubsoil) 5.82 1.857 | |
Presidential regime dummy for the 1970s (pres70s) 0.576 0.498 0.642 0.482
Majoritarian electoral rules dummy for the 1970s (maj70s) 0.5 0.505 0.530 0.503
Rule of law (rule) 2.81 1.069 2.729 1.026
Government e®ectiveness (goveffect) 2.875 1.07 2.753 1.035
Average openness 1950-1960 (open5060s) 0.434 0.237 0.442 0.233
Notes: Base sample for mineral dependence includes: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Bel-
gium, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Cameroon, Canada, China, Colombia, Rep. of Congo, C^ ote d'Ivoire,
Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, France, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Hon-
duras, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Korea, Malaysia, Mauritania, Mexico,
Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Senegal,
Sierra Leone, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey,
United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela, Zambia, Zimbabwe. In addition, the large sample for to-
tal natural resources includes: Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Costa
Rica, El Salvador, The Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius,
Nicaragua, Niger, Panama, Paraguay, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Uruguay. Variable sources and detailed
descriptions are given in Appendix B.
26Table 2. Institutional quality and natural resources
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
rule rule gove®ect gove®ect rule rule gove®ect gove®ect
latitude 2:519¤¤¤ 2:972¤¤¤ 2:706¤¤¤ 2:374¤¤¤ 2:631¤¤¤ 2:887¤¤¤ 2:486¤¤¤ 2:171¤¤¤
(0.554) (0.669) (0.53) (0.671) (0.57) (0.63) (0.53) (0.63)
lnnatcap 0:215¤¤¤ 0:209¤¤ 0:194¤ 0:208¤¤
(0.081) (0.082) (0.100) (0.093)
lnsubsoil 0:109¤¤ 0:097¤¤ 0:110¤¤ 0:132¤¤





Observations 89 63 89 63 83 61 83 61
F-stat 58:49¤¤¤ 55:24¤¤¤ 56:16¤¤¤ 43:73¤¤¤ 48:54¤¤¤ 49:04¤¤¤ 44:50¤¤¤ 37:61¤¤¤
R2 0.71 0.77 0.76 0.76 0.72 0.78 0.76 0.77
Notes: All regressions are OLS. Regional dummy variables included in all speci¯cations. Robust









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































28Table 4. Mineral dependence and institutions in democracies
(1) (2) (3) (4)





lsubsoil 0:015¤¤¤ 0:017¤¤¤ 0:165¤¤¤ 0:162¤¤¤









Obs 40 40 42 42
F-stat 2:72¤¤ 3:24¤¤¤ 43:66¤¤¤ 37:08¤¤¤
R2 0.62 0.66 0.82 0.80
Notes: All regressions are OLS. Regional dummy variables included in all speci¯cations. Country
sample includes democracies only, de¯ned by a 1972 Gastil score between 0 and 5. Robust standard





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































30Table 6. Mineral dependence, constitutions and institutions, and their impact
on economic growth (3SLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Economic growth g7000 g7000 g7000 g7000
minxp ¡2:261 ¡1:652 ¡1:973 ¡1:430
(1.39) (1.72) (1.54) (1.51)
lsubsoil 0:118¤¤ 0.057 0:130¤¤ 0.110*





lgdp70 ¡0:820¤¤ ¡0:828 ¡0:632 ¡0:513
(0.34) (0.64) (0.49) (0.56)
R2 0.59 0.50 0.50 0.50
Mineral dependence minxp minxp minxp minxp
pres70s 0:043¤ 0:045¤¤ 0:058¤ 0:072¤¤
(0.024) (0.023) (0.035) (0.032)
maj70s 0.013 0.011 0.02 0.022
(0.024) (0.023) (0.028) (0.026)
lsubsoil 0:016¤¤¤ 0:014¤¤ 0:014¤¤ 0:012¤





open5060s 0:267¤¤¤ 0:269¤¤¤ 0:292¤¤¤ 0:296¤¤¤
(0.045) (0.043) (0.050) (0.047)
R2 0.59 0.59 0.61 0.60
Institutions rule gove®ect rule gove®ect
latitude 3:277¤¤¤ 2:357¤¤¤ 3:511¤¤¤ 2:701¤¤¤
(0.57) (0.63) (0.67) (0.72)
lsubsoil 0:155¤¤¤ 0:154¤¤¤ 0:160¤¤¤ 0:160¤¤¤
(0.037) (0.042) (0.043) (0.047)
R2 0.82 0.79 0.83 0.80
Sample all all dems dems
Obs 51 51 40 40
Wald test lsubsoil 26:55¤¤¤ 22:81¤¤¤ 20:33¤¤¤ 18:88¤¤¤
Notes: All regressions are 3SLS. Regional dummy variables included in all speci¯cations. The Wald
test statistics refer to the hypothesis that the sum of the e®ects of lsubsoil is insigni¯cantly di®erent
from zero. Standard errors in parentheses. ¤, ¤¤, ¤¤¤ statistically signi¯cant at 10, 5, and 1 percent
levels, respectively.
31Appendix A: Additional tables
Table A. Correlations between different proxies for natural resource
abundance





lnatcap 0:359¤ 0:332¤ ¡0:005
(0:286¤) (0:245¤) ( 0.028)
lsubsoil 0:505¤ 0:509¤ 0.180 0:707¤
(0:448¤) (0:534¤) (0.008) (0:654¤)
Notes: The table depicts Pearson's correlations and Spearman's rank correlations in parentheses below.
* denotes signi¯cance at 5 percent level or below. sxp denotes the GNP share of total primary resource
exports in 1970 used in Sachs and Warner (1997). The other variables are described in Appendix B.
32Table B. Institutions, constitutions, and natural resources
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
rule gove®ect rule gove®ect rule gove®ect rule gove®ect
latitude 2:480¤¤¤ 2:130¤¤¤ 3:041¤¤¤ 2:383¤¤¤ 2:519¤¤¤ 2:367¤¤¤ 3:310¤¤¤ 2:982¤¤¤
(0.579) (0.629) (0.658) (0.749) (0.74) (0.806) (0.883) (0.986)
pres70s ¡0:338¤¤ ¡0:26 ¡0:24 ¡0:134 ¡0:366¤ ¡0:118 ¡0:19 0:09
(0.164) (0.167) (0.176) (0.169) (0.191) (0.211) (0.245) (0.241)
maj70s 0:246¤ 0:132 0:024 ¡0:02 0:262¤ 0:198 0:126 0:054
(0.129) (0.131) (0.13) (0.133) (0.142) (0.151) (0.135) (0.158)
lnatcap 0:254¤¤ 0:290¤¤¤ 0:286¤¤ 0:281¤¤
(0.097) (0.105) (0.107) (0.116)
lsubsoil 0:133¤¤¤ 0:149¤¤¤ 0:152¤¤ 0:167¤¤
(0.049) (0.053) (0.061) (0.065)
Sample All All All All Dems Dems Dems Dems
Obs 68 68 54 54 53 53 42 42
F-stat 47:54¤¤¤ 36:76¤¤¤ 44:85¤¤¤ 31:52¤¤¤ 41:28¤¤¤ 30:88¤¤¤ 37:82¤¤¤ 26:73¤¤¤
R2 0.78 0.78 0.82 0.79 0.79 0.77 0.83 0.8
Notes: All regressions are OLS. Regional dummy variables included in all speci¯cations. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. ¤, ¤¤, ¤¤¤ statistically signi¯cant at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels,
respectively.
33Table C. Mineral dependence and the finer points of constitutional design
(1) (2) (3) (4)
minxp minxp minxp minxp
majpres 0:074¤¤ 0:074¤¤ 0:090¤¤ 0:096¤¤¤
(0.035) (0.036) (0.040) (0.036)
propres 0:054¤ 0:054¤ 0:108¤ 0:121¤¤
(0.029) (0.031) (0.055) (0.051)
majpar 0.027 0.023 0:060¤¤ 0:064¤¤
(0.027) (0.029) (0.027) (0.026)
lnsubsoil 0:021¤¤¤ 0:022¤¤¤ 0:016¤¤¤ 0:018¤¤¤
(0.0062) (0.0059) (0.0053) (0.0051)
open5060s 0:260¤¤¤ 0:257¤¤¤ 0:299¤¤¤ 0:305¤¤¤





Sample all all dems dems
Obs 52 52 40 40
F-stat 3:12¤¤¤ 3:23¤¤¤ 2:70¤¤ 3:26¤¤¤
Wald test p-value 0.15 0.16 0.11 0.05
R-squared 0.58 0.58 0.63 0.67
Notes: All regressions are OLS with regional control variables. majpres is dummy variable for majori-
tarian electoral rules and presidential governmental system; propres for proportional electoral rules
and presidential system; majpar for majoritarian electoral rules and parliamentary system; and propar
is the omitted dummy variable, referring to proportional electoral rules in a parliamentary system.
Europe and Central Asia is omitted regional dummy variable. p-values are given for the Wald test of
joint signi¯cance of the constitutional dummy variables (null hypothesis of joint signi¯cance insigni¯-
cantly di®erent from zero). Robust standard errors in parentheses. ¤, ¤¤, ¤¤¤ statistically signi¯cant
at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
34Appendix B: Variables and sources
Economic development










t ) ¤ 100. Source: PWT 6.1.
lgdp70: Log of real GDP per capita in 1970. Source: PWT 6.1.
Resource exports and abundance
agrixp: GDP share of yearly agricultural raw materials exports, averaged over 1970-1980.
Agricultural raw materials comprise SITC section 2 (crude materials except fuels) excluding
divisions 22, 27 (crude fertilizers and minerals excluding coal, petroleum, and precious stones),
and 28 (metalliferous ores and scrap). Sources: WDI, and PWT 6.1 for missing GDP data.
lnatcap: Log of total natural capital, estimated in USD per capita for 1994. The mea-
sure includes subsoil assets, timber resources, non-timber forest resources, protected areas,
cropland, and pastureland. Source: World Bank (1997).
lsubsoil: Log of subsoil assets, estimated in USD per capita for 1994. The measure
includes energy resources (oil, natural gas, hard coal, lignite) and other mineral resources
(bauxite, copper, gold, iron, lead, nickel, phosphate, silver, tin, zinc). Source: World Bank
(1997).
minxp: GDP share of total yearly mineral exports, de¯ned as the sum of mineral fuels,
ores and metal exports, averaged over 1970-1980. Fuels comprise SITC section 3 (mineral
fuels); ores and metals comprise the commodities in SITC sections 27 (crude fertilizer, minerals
not elsewhere speci¯ed (n.e.s.)), 28 (metalliferous ores, scrap), and 68 (non-ferrous metals).
Sources: WDI, and PWT 6.1 for missing GDP data.
natxp: GDP share of total yearly natural resource exports, de¯ned as the sum of mineral
and agricultural raw materials exports, averaged over 1970-1980. Sources: WDI, and PWT
6.1 for missing GDP data.
Constitutions and institutions
gove®ect: Measures the quality of the bureaucracy and of public services in 1996. Re-
calibrated to assume values between zero (worst) and 5 (best). Source: Kaufmann et al.
(2005).
maj70s: Binary indicator for majoritarian (plurality) elections of house representatives.
Coded 1 when majority or all house members elected by plurality rule. Coded 0 when majority
or all members elected by proportional rule. Value for early 1970s. Sources: Beck et al. (2005),
Persson & Tabellini (2004).
pres70s: Binary indicator for form of government, coded 1 if the chief executive is directly
presidential or a strong president elected by an assembly. Coded 0 if parliamentary. Value for
early 1970s. Sources: Beck et al. (2005), Persson & Tabellini (2004).
rule: Measures the quality of contract enforcement, the police and the courts, as well
as the likelihood of crime and violence in 1996. Recalibrated to assume values between zero
(worst) and 5 (best). Source: Kaufmann et al. (2005).
Other variables
latitude: Absolute value of latitude of a country on a scale of 0 to 1. Source: La Porta
et al. (1999).
open5060s: Measure of trade openness (in nominal terms), de¯ned as the sum of imports
and exports over GDP. Average between 1950 and 1969. Source: PWT 6.1.
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